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Abstract
The paper has three aims. First, it presents the specific forward-looking
methodology applied in the quantitative analysis undertaken in the
Commission study, and discusses how it is able to overcome some of the
most important limitations of the traditional King Fullerton approach. Second,
it compares the results obtained by two different indicators, the traditional
effective marginal tax rate and the effective average tax rate, the latter being
particularly important to explain location decisions of multinational
companies. Third, it discusses the usefulness of these indicators for policy
makers, by summarising the overall results of the Commission study and
their policy implications. All in all, these results show that the EU tax systems
are very far from representing a level playing field for both domestic and
international firms and  that the size of the observed disparities in effective
tax rates between Member States are mainly due to the differences in
statutory tax rates. The picture arising from the quantitative analysis seems
to point out the urgent need for a greater co-ordination in the EU, with a view
to reducing the existing distortions and contributing to other important EU
objectives.















The ECOFIN Council in December 1998 asked the Commission to carry out an analytical
and comprehensive study on company taxation in the EU. This study should, among other
things, "illuminate existing differences in effective corporate taxation in the Community" in
view of their "effects on the location of economic activity and investments"
1. 
Differences in effective tax burdens amongst national jurisdictions within the EU and
subsequent possible tax competition may give rise to two different behaviours of firms. On
the one hand, effective tax rates differentials may create incentives to locate new
production or to relocate existing ones in certain countries thus impacting on resource
allocation, employment and economic activity in general. On the other hand, tax
differentials may induce tax optimisation processes by location of the taxable base with a
subsequent loss of tax revenues for some jurisdictions, without much incidence on the
actual production location and economic activity. The mandate given to the Commission
clearly refers to the effects of corporate tax differentials on resource allocation.
Policy makers have long been aware of the possible impediments to investment and savings
created by capital income taxation. Indeed, one of the main recurrent objectives of tax
reforms undertaken in the EU countries during the last twenty years, as well as in the OECD
countries in general, has been a reduction of possible tax induced distortions to the
allocation of resources to both domestic and international investments mainly by a reduction
of the statutory tax rate
2. At the same time, preferential tax regimes and special investment
tax regimes have been introduced. It is therefore not by chance that, in a moment when the
EU is undertaking a profound analysis of the (harmful) effects of the working of preferential
regimes of Member States
3, the question of the impact of general tax regimes on resource
allocation is raised.
The mandate received by the Commission is quite clear concerning the scope of the analysis
of effective tax rates. In broad terms it demands a quantitative assessment of how the
general criteria of efficiency of company tax system is satisfied at the EU level, taking into
                                                
1 See EEC (2001a).
2 The reduction of the statutory rate decreases, but does not eliminate, distortions. The reason for which policy
makers preferred policies of tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening, rather than tax reforms which are more
neutral with respect to domestic investment and financing choices, has mainly to do with the increasing
mobility of capital. See, for example, Haufler and Shjelderup (2000), Bordignon et al. (2001).
3 See Council of the European Union (1999).3
account the existence -and therefore the features- of 15 different general tax regimes. This
paper describes the methodology chosen by the Commission services, following the advice
of a panel of academic experts, in order to compute the corporate effective tax rates to
comply with the mandate of the ECOFIN Council
4. It describes also the pros and cons of the
applied methodology and the way in which the methodological limitations have been
managed. Finally, it discusses the usefulness of these indicators for policy-makers and
suggests the principal policy implications of the quantitative results presented in the
Commission services study.
2 Different possible approaches to compute the effective tax rates
When policy makers or economic agents want to evaluate the impact of taxation on
economic activity and understand the usefulness and likely effects of their decisions, they
need to assess tax burdens and the impact of taxes on economic activity. In the framework
of company taxation, although statutory corporate tax rates give some information, this is
rather limited. In fact, statutory tax rates do not evaluate the tax burdens really suffered, the
diversity of the elements composing the tax base or, in international comparisons, the
interrelations of different tax regimes. Effective corporate tax rates are measures designed to
assess tax burdens and the impact of taxes on the economic activity. They are the result of
the statutory tax rate applied to the tax base. The tax base is the profit expressed in
accordance with tax legislation - accounting profit is often subject to a series of adjustments
to arrive at the taxable profit or base.
In assessing effective corporate tax burdens, two types of framework can be distinguished.
One approach measures effective tax rates on the basis of current data arising from
aggregate macroeconomic accounts or from accounts of existing firms. By referring to the
observation of ex-post data it is called a "backward-looking" -macro or micro- approach.
Effective tax rates based on macro backward-looking methodologies are often referred to as
"implicit tax rates". The second framework refers to "ex-ante" indicators involving the
calculation of effective tax burdens, for a hypothetical prospective investment project or
company, over the assumed life of the project. Being based on future hypothetical behaviour
these indicators are defined as "forward-looking".
                                                
4 The experts who assisted the Commission in this work were Ms. S. Giannini and Messrs. K. Andersson, M.
Devereux, J. Le Cacheux, C. Spengel, J.M. Tirard, F. Vanistendael.4
The existence of different indicators is not, per se, a shortcoming of this kind of analysis, but
simply reflects the fact that each indicator measures different things. Different indicators can
be appropriate depending on different policy questions
5. Therefore, it is worth emphasising
that it is impossible to compute "the universally valid" effective tax rate. Moreover, this
measure not only depends on the chosen approach, but also on the particular way in which
the approach is applied. 
When policy makers are concerned with the effects of increasing mobility of capital in terms
of a gradual shifting of the tax burden away from capital to labour or consumption, or are
interested in knowing the actual tax burden on small versus large firms or the tax burden on
different industries or types of economic activity located in their country, compared with
others and over time, then the use of backward-looking indicators may be a useful policy
tool. Generally, this approach is useful to address issues concerning the distribution of the
tax burden and the effects of tax legislation and possible changes of the tax code on the cash
flow of companies. They also permit a better understanding of the sensitivity of tax revenues
to the economic cycle. While these indicators may possibly give an accurate picture of the
tax position of a particular company, they cannot give an accurate picture of the incentives
generated by a particular tax regime for a number of reasons. In particular, tax payments in
any period may depend crucially on the past history of the company and hence may vary
between companies which are currently otherwise identical. When the analysis of the impact
of taxation on investment behaviour is the objective, and therefore the effects of tax
legislation on future choices has to be captured, then only perspective indicators can
illustrate the structure of the incentives (and disincentives) given by taxation systems to the
investment choices of companies. Forward-looking indicators are tailored to answer this
kind of question and, therefore, are a useful policy tool when efficiency and competitiveness
concerns paramount. 
Taking into account the scope of the analysis of the effective corporate tax rate in the study,
the Commission services and the panel of experts agreed on the need to compute micro
forward-looking indicators. In fact, these indicators permit one to "isolate" the structure of
incentives and disincentives given by the different tax systems to undertake a specific
investment, and to take into account the interrelations of different tax systems. Therefore,
they permit one to compare international tax regimes and to identify the most important tax
                                                
5 See OECD (2001).5
drivers influencing the effective tax rates. Nevertheless, mainly due to their hypothetical
nature, forward-looking indicators suffer from specific shortcomings (see below) and the
quantitative results therefore have to be interpreted whilst keeping in mind these
methodological constraints.
Data arising from the application of forward-looking methodologies illustrate how taxation
can influence the incentive structure of investors. To what extent taxation has an impact on
actual economic decisions, depends, however, on other economic factors and on to what
extent taxes offset or reinforce other distortions in the economy. Therefore the simple
analysis of tax differentials does not permit one to precisely quantify the welfare
implications and the efficiency losses arising from particular incentive structures of the tax
systems.
Traditional analysis of the taxation of income from capital has focused on the impact of tax
on marginal investment decisions in the framework of the model developed by King and
Fullerton (1984): the principal impact of tax on investment is through the cost of capital and
is generally measured by an effective marginal tax rate. The effective marginal tax rate
measures the present value of expected taxes from a hypothetical marginal investment,
identical for each country considered, relative to the expected income. Therefore this
approach computes directly the tax wedge between the rate of return on investment of a
series of hypothetical investments and a given rate of return on savings. The size of the tax
wedge depends upon the characteristics of each tax regime, the assumptions concerning the
hypothetical investment in terms of assets and sources of finance and the assumptions
concerning the economic context in which the investment takes place. Considering that the
assumptions related to the economic context and the structure of the investment are identical
for each country considered, the application of this methodology enables one to "isolate" the
impact of taxation and therefore to make international comparisons.
The King and Fullerton methodology was originally conceived to compare the effective tax
rates levied on capital income from domestic investments in the non financial corporate
sector. Subsequently, the analysis has been extended in order to take into account and
compare the cost of capital for transnational investments and therefore to capture the effects
of the interactions of the international tax system. An OECD study (1991) and the "Ruding"
report (EEC, 1992) presented the first extensions of the King and Fullerton (K&F)
methodology to international investments. It is worth noting that the mandate of the Council
explicitly asks the Commission "to take into account, inter alia, the results of the report of
the Ruding Committee".6
2.1 Pros and cons of the King and Fullerton approach
When deciding to apply a forward-looking methodology in order to comply with the request
of the Council, the Commission services and the panel of experts were well aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the traditional K&F approach. The choice of the specific
forward-looking methodology applied in the Commission study, as well as the structure of
the analysis, were carefully considered, as were the specific methodological shortcomings
linked to the K&F methodology. This section briefly summarises the advantages and the
disadvantages of the K&F model. The next section presents the way in which the limitations
of this methodology have been overcome in the Commission services study.
The most striking advantage of the K&F methodology is that it is a simple approach which
provides a common framework for analysis that permits accurate comparisons of tax
systems. It therefore enables one to build summary indicators which summarise and quantify
the essential features of the tax systems thus permitting a comparison of different tax
regimes across countries and over time. In this way the interactions among the most
important aspects of the corporate tax regimes are highlighted and the weight of specific
features of taxation systems in determining the effective tax burdens is captured. Moreover,
this methodology has the advantage of being the most familiar internationally. It is evident
that these characteristics are particularly useful for policy makers.
But, mainly due to its hypothetical nature and to the simplicity of the approach, the K&F
methodology also has a number of limitations and characteristics, which have to be carefully
considered:
a)  This approach does not take into consideration a situation in which losses occur. In
fact, by definition, the model is constructed on the basis of a marginal investment whose
expected rate of return has to be no less than the cost of capital. Moreover it is considered
that the company is not "tax exhausted" and can fully make use of the benefits of the tax
legislation. In addition to carrying (back or forward) of losses, a number of other detailed
features of actual tax systems are not incorporated into the model, such as, for instance,
different kinds of provisions in the different countries. In principle, it would usually be
possible to incorporate all the details of the tax legislation in the calculation of effective tax
rates, but this will increasingly complicate the underlying model and multiply the number of
possible cases to be analysed, with the risk of making the results less general and just as
difficult to interpret as the tax codes themselves.7
b)  The quantitative results highly depend on the assumptions underlying the definition
of the hypothetical investment considered and the economic framework in which the
investment takes place. As far as the economic context is concerned, the most important
hypotheses concern the rate of inflation, the interest rate and the exchange rate (if any).
Concerning the definition of the hypothetical investment, assumptions have to be made on
the weight of the assets composing the investment, as well as the weight of the different
sources of finance.
c)  The quantitative results depend also on the assumption concerning capital market
integration and therefore capital market equilibrium conditions in the observed countries and
zone. This assumption is particular relevant when assessing the role and weight of personal
taxation - the taxation of the shareholders - on effective corporate tax rates. Moreover, in the
K&F model two rates of return are alternatively used to compute the impact of taxation on
the cost of capital: the pre-tax rate of return (p) and the post rate of return (r = real interest
rate). In order to compute the tax wedge one of these two variables has to be fixed. The
assumption in terms of capital market equilibrium is relevant when choosing a "fixed r" case
or a "fixed p" case. In the Commission study the decision was taken to use a "fixed r".
d)  The K&F model does not derive the possible optimal financial policy for a company,
given the incentives of the tax regime and the legal constraints to financial and dividend
policy. Therefore, the weights of the sources of finance are exogenous to the model and are
not the results of a maximisation function derived by the model itself.
e)  The K&F methodology focuses on the impact of taxation on a marginal investment,
that is an investment whose expected pre-tax rate of return just equalises the net cost of the
project with the present value of its after-tax profit. However, in many circumstances, when
competition on the product markets is not perfect, investment choices do not correspond to
this framework and the investor faces a choice between two or more exclusive projects that
are expected to earn more than the minimum required rate of return.
f)  The K&F methodology considers that the decision to invest and locate somewhere is
influenced only by capital taxation and that the incidence of the other elements of taxation is
borne by other economic agents. However, in practice, company decisions in terms of
location may depend on other non profit related taxes and charges. These other taxes, such
as trade taxes, payroll taxes or energy taxes may act as incentives (or disincentives) when
companies take investment decisions.
Some other fundamental limitations relate to the K&F methodology. In particular it is
assumed that current investment decisions are made on the basis of the current tax rules and8
the current economic framework. The K&F tax wedges are the appropriate parameters for
simulating business decisions only if the current situation forms an unbiased guide to future.
Therefore, risk and uncertainty are not considered and the results generated by this model
form the basis on which firms would make marginal investment decisions, if they expect no
further changes. Moreover investment is a reversible choice. These last limitations were not
even discussed in the context of the Commission's panel. In fact, introducing greater
complexities into the model would have detracted from more important issues, without
much benefit for the scope of the analysis. 
3 The methodology applied in the Commission study
The methodology suggested by the panel's experts and chosen by the Commission is based
on the traditional K&F approach, but has taken into account the different arguments
discussed above in order to manage some methodological shortages of this approach. The
questions raised in the previous section were addressed as follows:
a) Considering that the K&F model, based on the notion of cost of capital of a hypothetical
investment, does not incorporate losses and other elements of the tax base, it was decided to
complement the analysis in two ways. First, by a qualitative assessment of the major
structural features of the tax regimes of each Member State to enable a comparison between
more of the structural elements and assist in the identification of similarities and differences
between Member States' approach to company taxation. However, the qualitative analysis in
the Commission study suggests that, although there are differences in the tax treatment of
structural elements of the tax regimes among Member States, such differences are largely
compensatory. Therefore it is rather difficult, simply on the basis of a qualitative
assessment, to infer the impact of such differences on effective tax rates. This result seems
to reinforce, in turn, the need for a quantitative analysis.
It was therefore decided to complement the main computation with the application of
another forward-looking methodology, the "European Tax Analyser" model designed by the
University of Mannheim and ZEW (Spengel, 1999), which includes a large majority of the
relevant tax provisions and, in particular the carry-over of losses. The purpose being to test
whether the results of the application of a different approach, which includes more features
of the tax systems, confirm the general results arising from the main computation. The
conceptual framework of the "European Tax Analyser" model is significantly different from
the traditional framework of the K&F approach and involves calculating and comparing the
effective tax burden for hypothetical future model firm behaviours, using the statutory9
features of the tax regimes. The calculations are based on an industry-specific mix of assets
and liabilities taking as a base case a typical medium-sized manufacturing company. Based
on this existing capital stock, the future pre-tax profits are derived on the basis of
hypothetical developments of future cash receipts and cash expenses associated with this
initial capital stock. The tax liabilities are then derived by taking into account the tax bases
according to the national rules, and then applying the national tax rates. This model
computes effective average tax rates which measure the effective tax burden of projects that
earn more than the capital cost.
This approach does not represent the optimal investment behaviour of companies, and it
relies heavily on the particular characteristic of the model firm, in particular the initial
capital stock and the expected development of the capital stock over the simulation period.
No explicit assumptions are made about the competitive situation of production factor
markets and therefore the incidence of factors other than capital taxation, but implicitly the
reasoning is based on the assumption that some elements of the non-corporate tax system
(for instance some payroll taxes) are in fact born by companies. 
The set of assumptions underlying this model may be questionable on economic grounds
and different opinions emerged in the discussion among the members of the panel. But, as
the Commission study clearly states, the data arising from the application of the "Tax
Analyser" model are presented only with the purpose to test and, possibly, confirm the
general picture arising from the application of the "hypothetical investment" approach. In
fact, the application of the "Tax Analyser model - which is limited to the analysis of the
effective rate of taxation of domestic investment for 6 countries (Germany, France, the
Netherlands, the UK, Ireland and the USA) - although producing different numerical data,
confirms the general picture and the principal results arising from the main computation (see
section 4.2 below).
b) As in every perspective analysis, the quantitative results are based on a set of very
specific hypothetical investments under specific economic conditions. It is therefore
essential to examine the effects of altering these assumptions, thereby illustrating the
sensitivity of the results to the assumptions made. It is important to stress again that the data
arising from the application of a forward-looking methodology should not be regarded as the
universally valid values for the effective tax burdens in different countries. But, even if there
are no universally valid values, it is important to check whether it is possible to make
generally valid statements regarding differences in the effective tax burdens. The
Commission study therefore contains a wide sensitivity analysis, which recalculates the10
effective tax rates several times, each time varying the main parameters of the model. These
changes concern both the economic variables and the way in which the hypothetical
investment is defined. All in all, the sensitivity analysis in the Commission study
demonstrates that in most cases the parameters used in the model tend to have little effect on
the overall EU values of the effective tax burden. However, as expected, the exact value of
the effective tax burden is rather sensitive to changes in the value of economic parameters,
notably the interest rate. The analysis shows also that there is considerable stability in the
rankings of countries across the different element of the sensitivity analysis and suggests
that the base case does give a reasonable indication of the relative position of Member
States.
c) The original K&F approach refers to a closed economy and computes the overall tax
wedge between the before-tax and post-tax rate of return by including corporate as well as
personal taxation. As is well known from the economic literature, in open economies with
international mobile capital, the role of personal taxation on investment decisions raises
much more complex issues than in a closed economy. First of all, one should consider the
possibility that the saver holds domestic as well as international portfolio assets and that
bulk of domestic and international allocation of saving occurs through some intermediary,
rather than by direct holding. Moreover, some assumption must be made concerning the
arbitrage conditions on the international capital markets, the identity of the “marginal”
shareholder and its tax status. All these important topics were discussed in the panel and,
even allowing for some individual different points of view, it was considered that the more
relevant case was the one in which personal taxation is absent. In short, this is coherent with
the assumption that the tax rate of the marginal investor is zero (e.g. a tax exempt
intermediary) or, alternatively, that the amount of domestic saving lets unaffected the world
interest rate and taxes are residence based. In both situations the investment decisions of the
domestic corporate sector will tend to be unaffected by the amount of domestic saving, in so
far as companies will be generally able to obtain finance at the prevailing world rate of
interest (fixed-r). The taxation of the shareholder or, more generally, of the supplier of
finance, is unlikely to affect the international allocation of capital. For the above reasons the
Commission study limits the computations which do take into account personal taxation to
only some cases, which are of particular relevance to the behaviour of SMEs, as they may
have more difficulties accessing the international financial market.
d) In response to the question related to the possible optimal financial policy for a company,
it was decided not to try to implement complex (and somewhat questionable) maximisation11
models. But, at the same time, to add realism to the analysis, it was decided to take into
account the possible optimisation of the financing policy of a company by means of
supplementary sets of computations. It was considered realistic that parent companies would
try to minimise their global tax burdens either by choosing the most convenient source of
finance for the subsidiary, or by making use of more complex financial arrangements.
Therefore, the study presents on the one hand, a "tax minimisation approach", which
considers how the international tax regime affects the effective tax burden faced by a
company willing to invest abroad when it chooses the most tax-efficient means of financing
the subsidiary and, on the other hand, some selected examples of the effects of tax
optimisation by means of financial intermediaries. 
e) In many circumstances investment choices do not correspond to the framework developed by
K&F, based on the effects of corporate income taxes on investments that are "marginal" or only
just worth undertaking for investors. In fact, when investors are interested in measuring the
impact of corporate income taxes on relatively profitable investment opportunities, they are
interested in the share of the pre-tax value of a profitable investment project that is taken away
by corporate tax income. The effective average tax rate is a measure of this share. This
effective average tax rate is particularly relevant in context where firms are choosing an
investment from a set of mutually exclusive and otherwise similar profitable investments.
Taking into account the empirical relevance of these kinds of choices, the panel of experts
strongly suggested the computation of effective average tax rates in order to correctly and
exhaustively reply to the mandate given by the Council. For this purpose, it was decided to
apply a revised and extended methodology based on the King and Fullerton approach, set out
by Devereux and Griffith (1998a). The next section illustrates the main characteristics of this
approach, which represents the most interesting methodological extension of the quantitative
analysis presented in the Commission study. It is worth noting that, as said before, the "Tax
Analyser" model, which was used as a complementary tool, also computes effective average
tax rates.
f) The mandate clearly stated that the study should focus on corporate taxation only.
Nevertheless a number of experts in the panel agreed that the relation between other types of
taxes and location decisions is an important one and should be the object of carefully
consideration in the future. This issue is highly dependent on the assumption made in terms
of incidence of these non-profit taxes, considering that such incidence may change over time
depending also on the growing importance of these non-profit taxes in the EU. 12
3.1 The Devereux-Griffith approach to compute effective tax rates 
As anticipated in the previous section, one of the most interesting extensions of the quantitative
analysis presented in the Commission study, with respect to other studies, is the computation of
the effective average tax rates, that is to say effective tax rates on investment projects
generating extra-profits or economic rents.  
There is a growing economic literature underlying the importance of the effective average tax
rates for international investment decision
6. For example, Devereux and Griffith (1998b) found
that the effective average tax rate is an important variable to explain the choice by US
multinational of where to locate in the EU, subject to the primary decision to invest in the
Common EU Market, which is highly driven by other non tax factors.
To compute the effective average tax rates the Commission study mainly relies on the
methodology developed by Devereux and Griffith (D&G), and applied also in Bond and
Chennels (2000). This approach, that can be considered a sort of extension of the K&F
methodology and as such relies on the same economic logic, has the advantage of allowing the
computation of both effective marginal tax rate and effective average tax rate under a unique
framework.
In practice, the D&G model computes what we may simply call an “effective tax rate” for
alternative hypothetical investment projects with different rates of profitability, which
illustrates respectively: 
a)  the effective marginal tax rate, if the real before-tax return is the minimum rate required to
undertake the investment, that is to say, is equal to the cost of capital; 
b)  the whole series of the effective average tax rates, if the project is not marginal, i.e. it
generates economic rents. 
The effective tax rate (ETR) is measured as the ratio between the present value of taxes and the
present value of pre tax income expected by a company from alternative new investment
projects that can be either marginal (effective marginal tax rate) or infra-marginal (effective
average tax rate) in their post-tax returns. More precisely, the numerator is the difference
between the present value of the rent of the investment before tax (R*) and after tax (R), and
the denominator by which these taxes are scaled down is the net present value of the pre-tax
income stream, net of depreciation (Y*):
                                                












We will not enter here into the details of the model, but briefly explain its major assumptions.
The implications of the model will be discussed, and more clearly understood, when
commenting on the results, in the next section. 
The D&G analytical framework is very simple as it is based on a one-period perturbation of the
capital stock: an hypothetical investment undertaken in period t, and providing a real return
equal to p, is reversed in period t+1. The financial policy of the company strictly follows this
one period perturbation of the capital stock. The value of the firm is derived from a standard
capital market equilibrium condition, according to which a representative shareholder (a
domestic resident) will hold equity shares only up to the point where their net return is equal to
the net return from selling the company and investing the assets in the best alternative
investment available (say, Treasury bonds).
If the value of the firm does not change, as a consequence of this perturbation policy, this
means that the before tax return of the investment undertaken in period t is just equal to the
cost of capital and the investment is marginal. If, on the contrary, the one-period change in the
capital stock increases the value of the company, then the investment project is earning
economic rents. 
Given the real market interest rate r, and recalling that p is real return on the investment, the










and the present value of the pre tax net income Y* is:








The post tax economic rent (Rt in equation (1)), which we do not replicate here for simplicity,
is a much more complex expression containing all tax parameters, the economic depreciation
rate, the rate of return on investment, the rate of inflation. Moreover, it is differently defined
depending on the financing choices of the company.
The effective marginal tax rate is computed by setting the post tax economic rents (Rt in
equation (1)) equal to zero and solving for the rate of return p. The latter, denoted by  ~ p, is the
minimum return the company must earn, net of depreciation, in order to cover the costs of the
investment, including the cost of finance, and given the real market interest rate r. In the D&G14
model the effective marginal tax rate is therefore computed, using the K&F terminology,
according to the fixed-r case.
The effective average tax rate is computed for a given value of the real market interest rate (r),
as well as for different hypothetical before-tax rates of return on the investments (p), higher
than the cost of capital ( ~ p). Hence, for each particular investment project defined as the
acquisition of a specific asset financed with debt, new equity or retained earnings, it is possible
to compute the effective marginal tax rate and the whole range of the effective average tax
rates,  for all the possible values of the real return higher than the cost of capital.
The D&G model is extended to international direct investment too, using an approach similar
to that used in OECD (1991). It considers a parent company resident in country j which
undertakes an investment in country i through a fully owned subsidiary. The parent company,
in turn, is owned by shareholders located in country j, so that the equilibrium condition
defining the value of the firm does not change with respect to the domestic case.  The
subsidiary finances the increase in investment through retained earnings, new shares issued to
the parent company and borrowing from the parent. 
The DG model’s assumptions differ somewhat from those of the traditional K&F and OCD
models, but the effect of these differences on results are of minor importance and the two
approaches are highly consistent in the effective marginal tax rate they can generate. 
4. Do effective marginal tax rates and effective average tax rates provide a different picture
of tax distortions?
In this section we will start presenting some of the most interesting results of the Commission
study. The major objective, here, is to focus on the relationship between the effective marginal
rates, the effective average tax rate and the statutory rate. More precisely, we are interested in
showing whether the effective average tax rate can provide a different picture from the one
based on the traditional effective marginal tax rate indicator, and therefore be a useful
complementary indicator to the analysis of the effective tax burden on companies.
Three elements emerge as particularly important in explaining the observed differences
between the effective marginal tax rate and the effective average tax rates and their relation
with the statutory rate. These are, in brief:
a)  the amount of the deductions allowed from the tax base, notably for interest payments
and depreciation;
b)  the source used to finance investment (equity or debt);
c)  the rate of profitability assumed to compute the effective average tax rate.15
To provide a preliminary general picture of how these factors interact, Table 1 takes as an
example some of the most general results of the Commission study, relative to the EU as a
whole. Effective average tax rates are computed for two different rates of profitability: 20%
and 40%. The results are illustrated separately for the different sources of finance considered in
the study, and refer to the base case of a domestic investment without personal taxes. Similar
considerations could be made, however, using the results for the international case. 
Table  1 Effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) and effective average tax rates
(EATR) in the EU (1999)
-  domestic investment
-   only corporation taxes
Source of finance EMTR EATR (20%) EATR (40%)
Retained earnings 32.6 33.5 33.5
New equity 31.6 33.1 33.3
Debt - 24.6 22.3 28
Mean 20.2 29.5 31.6
Table 1 shows, first of all, that the effective tax rate increases with profitability. Considering
the overall mean for the different sources of finance, the effective tax rate is 20.2% for a
marginal investment and grows to 29.5% and to 31.6% if the investment project generates a
real return equal to 20% and 40% respectively. The average statutory rate (including
surcharges and local taxes) in the EU is 34.7%
7. Hence, for the EU as a whole, the effective
marginal tax rate is lower than the effective average tax rate and the latter increases as profit
grows approaching progressively the nominal rate.  
In the absence of personal and capital taxes, the typical relation between the effective marginal
tax rate and the whole range of the effective average tax rates for different rates of profitability
can be illustrated by the graph in Figure 1, which refers to the Belgium case.
Figure 1  Effective Average Tax Rate and Profitability in Belgium
- only corporation taxes
                                                
7In 1999, Germany had a different rate on distributed and retained earnings. To compute the average statutory rate
for the EU, we considered  the rate on retained earnings. 16
- average across all forms of investments. 
The effective marginal tax rate is usually lower than  the effective average tax rate because of
the benefits of tax allowances from the tax base, for depreciation and interest payments, that
are more powerful in reducing the tax burden on marginal investments. As profits grow above
the minimum required rate, these allowances become relatively less important and the effective
tax burden is increasingly affected by the statutory rate. This explains also the different
behaviour of the effective tax rate with respect to the different sources of finance considered.
As Table 1 illustrates, there is not much difference between the effective marginal tax rate and
the effective average tax rate, when the source of finance is equity, whereas in the case of debt
the effective tax rate switches from a negative value (-24.6) to a positive value and the jump in
consistent. For a 20% rate of profitability the effective average tax rate is 22.3% and rises
further to 28% if the rate of return doubles to 40%. At the margin, the effective tax rate is
negative, because in addition to depreciation allowances (that are on average in the EU slightly
higher than the assumed economic depreciation rate), the company has the advantage of
deducting nominal interest payments from the tax base. It is a well known conclusion of the
economic literature that when depreciation allowances are greater than true economic ones and
are associated with interest payments deductibility, the corporation tax transforms into a
subsidy, at the margin. However, with the increase in profits above the minimum rate required
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profits increasingly affects the effective average tax rate, which becomes positive and rises
with profits towards the statutory rate.
Table 1 and Figure 1 also show that starting from the minimum required rate of return, the
effective tax rate increases rapidly with profitability up to the 20% rate, whereas the increase is
lower afterwards. Even if there are differences across countries, the  assumption of a 20% rate
of profitability underlying the basic calculations of the Commission study, is on average able
to capture most of the changes of the effective tax rate from the effective marginal tax rate to
the statutory rate, that is to say, from the marginal case to the most profitable investment
project.
4.1 A more detailed analysis for the EU Member States
As it is stressed in the Commission study, this aggregate picture hides noticeable differences
across the EU countries. Again as a representative example, Figures 2, 3 and 4 disaggregate the
data of Table 1 for each member state, and respectively for equity
8, debt financing, and overall
mean. The Figures only show the effective average tax rates computed assuming a 20% rate of
profitability,  but in addition the statutory rates, towards which the effective average tax rates
tend, are included.
In the case of equity finance (Figure 2), the effective marginal tax rate is positive in all
countries. However, even though in most countries the effective marginal tax rate is lower than
the statutory rate and the effective tax rate increases towards it with profitability, for other
Member States (Ireland, France, Denmark, Finland, and the UK) the effective tax rate for an
equity financed investment is slightly greater than the statutory rate and decreases with the
increase in profitability. The reason is the presence of relatively high real property taxes, like
real estates taxes in Ireland and the UK, that impose a greater effective tax burden on marginal
investments than on most profitable ones. This effect more than compensate, at the margin, the
benefits of the deductions from the tax base. 
Owing to these differences in the tax legislation, it may happen that by comparing countries
like, for example, Belgium and the UK, the difference is wider when looking at the effective
average tax rate rather than at the effective marginal tax rate. 
                                                
8 Equity finance is not distinguished here between new equity and retained earnings, in so far as in the absence of
personal taxes the two are equal for all countries but Germany, where in 1999 a two rate system was in force.
In this case the rate shown in the figure is an average using relative weights as used in the Report for these
two sources of finance.18
Figure 2 also shows that there are countries, like Spain or the Netherlands, where the three
indicators provide substantially the same picture, whereas in other situations the picture is very
different,  as is it the case for Italy. 
The peculiar situation of the Italian case, which shows a very low effective marginal tax rate
(10%) compared to the statutory rate (41.25%) is explained by the presence of accelerated
depreciation allowances and of a new equity allowance introduced in 1997. According to the
latter, an imputed component of profits, representing the opportunity cost of equity capital
(new equity and retained earnings) is taxed at a preferential rate (19%) rather than the statutory
37% corporate tax rate. This allowance has a powerful effects at the margin. So, if we compare
for example the effective marginal tax rate for Italy and Ireland, the former country appears to
be even less taxed than the latter, notwithstanding a much higher statutory rate (41.25%, in
Italy, including local taxes, vis-à-vis 10% in Ireland, used in this calculation). But the picture is
very different if one compares the effective average tax rate, which more closely reflects the
statutory rate. 19
Figure 2 Effective marginal tax rates, effective average tax rates (20% profitability) and
statutory rate in the case of equity finance (1999).
-  domestic investment 
-  only corporation taxes 
The analysis disaggregated by countries clearly confirms that the discrepancy between the
effective marginal tax rate and the effective average tax rate is wider when the source of
finance is debt (Figure 3).
In all countries, except Ireland, the effective marginal tax rate is negative when the investment
is debt financed. As mentioned before, this depends on the interaction between interest
payments deductibility and tax allowances for depreciation in excess to economic depreciation.
The subsidy is greater the more depreciation allowances are accelerated with respect to
economic depreciation, and the higher the statutory tax rate is. Sometimes, also countries with
fairly low statutory rate show the presence of a high subsidy (e.g. Sweden). As it is underlined
in the Commission study, the existence of an inverse relationship between the level of the
statutory tax rates and the wideness of the tax base cannot be generalised. 
The effective average tax rate is positive in all member states, but the jump is particularly high
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Figure 3 Effective marginal tax rate, effective average tax rate (20% profitability) and
statutory rate in the case of debt finance (1999). 
- domestic investment
 - only corporation taxes 
The overall mean results are illustrated in figure 4. Given the weights attributed to the sources
of finance, the effective marginal tax rate turns out to be always lower than the effective
average tax rate, except for Ireland, because of the relatively high real estate tax accompanied
by the low profit tax rate. It is also positive in all cases but Italy. As we have seen in
commenting Figures 2 and 3, this result is due to the tax legislation in force in Italy in 1999
which gave to equity financing a preferential tax treatment similar to the one usually reserved
to debt finance. As far as debt financing is concerned, Italy is not much different from the other
countries. 
Even if with less intensity than in Italy, other countries too show remarkable differences
between the three indicators considered in Figure 4. For these countries, mostly characterised
by narrow tax bases and relatively high statutory rates, the information provided by the
traditional effective marginal tax rate indicator are limited and might be highly confusing, if
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When looking at the effective marginal tax rate, countries like Italy and Greece appear very
attractive, more than say UK and Sweden or, for Italy, even Ireland. But the picture changes
considerably when looking at the effective average tax rate or at the statutory rate.  
Figure 4 Effective marginal tax rate, effective average tax rate (20% profitability) and
statutory rate. Overall mean (1999)
- domestic investment
 - only corporation taxes
5. The usefulness of effective tax rate indicators for policy makers
The extensive calculations presented in the Commission study provide a detailed and fairly
clear picture of the potential distortions introduced by the 15 different tax systems in the
allocation of capital within the EU and highlight the most important elements of the tax
legislation accounting for these distortions.  
In this section we will try to summarise the most important results, focusing the attention on
the usefulness of these indicators for policy makers with respect to both positive and normative
issues. In so doing we will sometime go beyond the comments of the study, or be more explicit
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1. First of all, the study shows that, notwithstanding the increased economic and monetary
integration, there are wide differences among the effective tax rates of the various countries
and this regards both domestic and international investment. The dispersion appears to be even
greater when looking at effective average, rather than marginal, tax rates. The effective average
tax rates  computed by using the European Tax Analyser model provide comparable results,
notwithstanding the different approach adopted, as outlined above. 
It is not easy to make comparisons with other studies and see whether there has been an
improvement in neutrality and a convergence of the 15 EU systems over time. Undoubtedly,
the general reduction in nominal tax rates, often accompanied by an enlargement in the tax
base, had the positive effect of reducing distortions and made the residual differences in tax
allowances less important. However, independently of the progress eventually and
spontaneously achieved, the differences remain particularly high: the ranges is around 37
points for a marginal domestic investment and 30 points in the case of a more profitable
investment; for transnational investment the difference between the effective tax burden of
subsidiaries located abroad can rise above 30 points. 
The 15 EU tax systems are very far from the benchmark of neutrality under many different
dimensions of this concept: across types of investment, sources of finances and specific
location.  
From these quantitative results, accompanied by the observation that the effects of tax
distortions are likely to have increased over time, along with the closer integration of the EU
market and the increase in capital mobility, it seems possible to conclude that the existing tax
systems may potentially bring about significant welfare losses. 
Two types of distortions deserve particular attention. 
In most countries there is still a wide discrimination between debt and equity financing,
notwithstanding the favourable effects of the reduction in the statutory rates, which reduced the
tax gap between these two sources of finance. The existence of this tax discrimination,
favouring debt financing, is repeatedly underlined in the Commission study, but it is not the
principal focus of the analysis, and possible remedial measures are not examined or even
suggested. The issue, which is widely discussed in the economic literature
9, should be given
more attention in the future policy debate on the EU tax policy for several reasons. On the one
hand, it is well known that in increasingly sophisticated financial markets, differences in the
                                                
9 With reference to policy options in the EU see for example, Cnossen (1998).23
tax treatment of debt and equity finance open wide arbitrage opportunities to decrease the tax
burden. On the other, the existence of a wide distortion in favour of debt finance conflicts with
the Commission’s goal of promoting equity capital to boost growth and job creation
10 and
exacerbates the concern expressed by the Commission about the risk of EU enterprises being
over-dependent on debt finance
11.  
Concerning international distortions on investment location, which is the focus of the study,
the results show that both Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) and Capital Import neutrality (CIN)
are violated. In general, the tax systems tend to be closer to CEN if the subsidiary is debt
financed and to CIN if it is equity financed. The main reasons are that interest from the
subsidiary to the parent is primarily taxed in the home country (according to the residence
principle), whereas profits are primarily taxed in the host country (source principle) either
because of deferral or because of exemption of dividends in the home country of the parent. 
The study is very clear in underlying that neutrality is not the only legitimate goal of tax policy
and that policy makers have to carefully balance efficiency with other, often conflicting, goals.
Member States, under the subsidiary principle, have fiscal autonomy and therefore this
"balancing" takes place at the Member States' level, and not at the EU level. Nevertheless there
is no doubt that the results of the Commission study clearly demonstrate that the Internal
Market is very far from representing a level playing field for both domestic and international
firms, and that there is a urgent need to improve both dimensions of neutrality, domestic and
international, to reach the goal set out in the Lisbon European Council of March, 2000 “ to
become the most competitive and dynamic-knowledge based economy in the world”.
2. A well known finding in both the OECD study (1991) and the "Ruding" Report (EEC, 1992)
was that inbound and outbound investment were more heavily taxed than otherwise identical
domestic investment. This general result is confirmed by the present study, when looking at
EU averages (p.6), but does not hold for every country. Usually, for countries with higher cost
of capital and particularly with high statutory rates outbound investment are less taxed than
                                                
10 EEC (1998).
11 EEC (1999).24
domestic investment whereas the opposite is true for the countries with lower cost of capital
and particularly lower statutory rates
12. 
All countries, except Germany, show an effective tax rate greater on inbound investment than
on domestic investment. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, outbound investment is
particularly attractive for countries with a high statutory rate. For the other countries, there are
obstacles to full integration, which take the form of additional taxation in the case of
transnational investment. Second, in all countries, except Germany, the tax system tends to
provide a competitive advantage to domestic companies over subsidiaries located in the same
country. 
It is worth recalling that these results refer to 1999, and thus do not take into account the recent
German tax reform. By considering the effects of this reform, the position of Germany changes
slightly: for example “post-reform inbound investment will have a very slightly higher cost of
capital than domestic investment (instead of a slightly lower cost of capital)” (p. 145), thus
making Germany more similar to the other countries. But on overall, the changes brought
about by the German tax reform to effective tax rates are not large enough to alter significantly
the relative tax position of this country within the EU. 
3. The extension of the study to effective tax rates on infra-marginal investment allows a
clearer interpretation of the impact of taxation on location decision. In most cases the two
indicators do not tell a very different story, concerning the ranking of the different countries
according to their effective tax burden, but as we have seen, in some cases the picture is  quite
different. The effective average tax rates are more strongly dependent upon the statutory rate of
the host country than the effective marginal tax rate. A country with a high statutory tax rate
may well have a very low or even negative effective marginal tax rate, but the effective
average tax rate will rapidly increase with profits if the statutory rate is high. Focusing on
effective average tax rate could explain why tax competition among the EU countries appears
to have taken the form of a reduction in the level of the statutory rate, and why countries with
the lower statutory rates (like Ireland) rather than lower cost of capital (like Italy) are likely to
attract the greatest bulk of foreign investment, particularly from outside the EU. 
                                                
12 These differences may be exacerbated, or reduced and even reversed, if one considers the possibility that the
parent has not enough undistributed profits and has to pay dividends from foreign source income received by
the subsidiary (p. 145).25
4. The tax differences which emerged in the analysis of cross-border investments indicate that
there can be considerable incentives for companies to alter their behaviour in order to minimise
their global tax burden. To analyse the potential impact of some of these strategies is another
useful use of the effective tax rate indicators. As mentioned in section 3, the study explores this
issue in two directions: on the one hand, by assuming that the parent company in all countries
can use the most efficient way to finance the subsidiary, on the other hand, by introducing
some examples of more sophisticated financial arrangements, which make use of a financial
intermediary (a Belgium coordination centre and a Dutch holding company). Under both
assumptions the effective tax rate on transnational investment drops remarkably. If the parent
company is fully flexible in choosing the most favoured source of finance for the subsidiary,
inbound and outbound investments turn out to be less taxed than domestic investment.
However dispersion of effective tax rates across countries remains very high. Similar
considerations emerge when more complex financial arrangements are examined. 
These results suggest two important conclusions for policy makers.
First of all, they show that the possibility of using financial arrangements to reduce the
effective tax burden “cannot remove all tax obstacles for cross border investment caused by
different tax rates and different tax bases” (p. 192), under the assumption that no other
possibility of profit shifting exists.
Secondly, they provide a quantitative indication of how useful these arrangements may be to
reduce the effective tax burden for those companies who can relatively easily and with little
additional cost implement these tax saving devices. Since such companies are usually the
largest ones, it follows that the optimisation of tax strategies, while reducing some real
distortions on factor allocation, is likely to contextually introduce new discriminations between
companies depending on their size. 
This observation is confirmed by the section of the study comparing, for some countries (UK,
Germany and Italy), the tax treatment of SME and partnerships with that of large corporations.
“The results of this section show that the specific tax rates applied to SMEs in the countries
analysed have the effect of lowering the effective tax burden. … But, when comparing the
results of this section with those … which examined the tax minimisation approach, it is worth
noting that small and medium sized enterprises in Germany, Italy and the UK bear a higher tax
burden than multinationals investing abroad” (p. 199).26
5. One of the advantages of the effective tax rate methodology used in the study is that it
permits one to separate the contribution of the different elements of the tax legislation in
explaining differences in the effective tax rates. A general result, widely confirmed by the
calculations presented in the study, is that the most important tax driver influencing the
effective tax burdens and their differences across countries is the overall nominal or statutory
tax rate; the corporate tax rate including surcharges and local rates. Tax rate differentials more
than compensate for differences in the tax base and the relative weight of rates in determining
the effective tax burden of companies rises along with the growth in the rate of profitability.
The results obtained with the European Tax Analyser model confirm the importance of this tax
factor.
6. Another important use of the effective tax rate indicators is to assess the efficiency content
of alternative tax policy changes. This is done, in the Commission study, by computing the
level and dispersion of effective tax rates under some alternative hypothetical tax policy
scenarios. The simulations are appositely done in such a way as to be able to evaluate
separately the contribution towards neutrality of each alternative tax policy change. 
These simulations confirm the importance of the statutory rate in determining the observed
differences in effective tax rates across countries. Tax rate harmonisation would be very
powerful in reducing dispersions of effective tax rates, above all effective average tax rates,
whereas harmonisation of the tax bases would not provide comparable gains in efficiency.
Things get even worse, in this case, above all when looking at the effective average tax rate for
outbound investment.  CEN is even further away.
As far as coordination of the transnational aspects of the tax system is concerned, the
simulations show that:
a)  abolishing withholding taxes on interest payments has usually no effects;  
b)  the adoption of full credit would move the system closer to CEN, whereas a
generalisation of the exemption system would help moving towards CIN;
c)   the adoption of the system called Home State Taxation (HST) would remarkably move
the system away from CEN, but this result partly depends on the assumption that all
profits are allocated back to the host country. So the home tax base is taxed at the host
country rate. Where there is a relationship between the definition of the tax base and the
tax rate, applying the tax rate of the host country to the tax base of the home country
has the effect of increasing distortions.27
The Commission study repeatedly warns that a great deal of caution is necessary in
deriving policy implications from the results of these simulations. They provide an
important guide, on how to move towards increased neutrality, but to evaluate alternative
policy scenarios other important factors must also be taken into consideration. First of all,
there is the need to reduce the compliance costs, for both companies and the tax
administrations, of having to deal with up to 15 different tax rules and regulations.
Secondly, there is the need to preserve the highest fiscal autonomy of Member States
which is compatible with the functioning of the internal market and the respect of the four
fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. Third, there is the need to find a solution ensuring
that some progress is made within a reasonable period of time, where “reasonable” should
mean the time dictated by the necessities of an increasingly integrated market. How to
trade off these often conflicting needs is the object of the proposals made in the other parts
of the Commission study, and will not be discussed here. However, in discussing the
different options it will be important to keep in mind that the quantitative simulations warn
of the distortion that might derive by coordinating the tax base without introducing some
limit to the freedom of Member States to set their national tax rates. 
6. Concluding remarks
The Commission's primary aim was to satisfy the Council's request to illuminate existing
differences in effective corporate taxation in the Community in view of their effects on the
location of economic activity and investments. For this purpose, the Commission study
applies a model conceived to analyse the incentives (or disincentives) given by taxation
systems to the investment choices of company. However, the analysis attempts to manage
some of the methodological shortcomings linked to the traditional King and Fullerton
forward-looking methodology. First by applying a revised and extended methodology  set
out by Devereux and Griffith, and secondly by complementing the "base case" analysis
with a set of computations aimed at adding more realism to the analysis.
As a consequence, it is the first time that a comprehensive study has analysed such a broad
range of indicators of the effective company tax burden, both marginal and average for the
Member States of the European Union. One of the most striking features of the quantitative
analysis in the study is that, across the range of different situations, the relevant
conclusions and interpretations remain relatively constant. Nevertheless, the comparative
analysis of effective marginal tax rates and effective average tax rates for individual28
countries shows that, even if in most cases the two indicators do not tell a very different
story, in some cases the picture is quite different.
The general results of the quantitative analysis seem to confirm that the common concerns
regarding corporate taxation expressed by the mandate given by Member States to the
Commission is justified. In general, the extensive calculation of the study shows that the
potential distortions introduced by the 15 different general tax systems in the allocation of
the capital within the EU are high and that the differences in nominal tax rates is the most
important factor accounting for these potential distortions. Moreover, the existence of wide
tax discrimination in favour of debt financing may conflict with the EU objectives of
promoting equity capital to boost economy and growth and exacerbates the risk of EU
enterprises becoming over-dependent on debt finance.
All in all, the quantitative results show that the Internal Market is very far from
representing a level playing field for both domestic and international firms and that the
present significant lack of domestic and international tax neutrality may conflict with the
objectives set in the Lisbon European Council. 
Therefore, the overall picture arising from the quantitative analysis suggests that the
"balancing" between economic efficiency and the other policy goals of taxation policy has
to be considered not only at Member States' level but also at the EU level. Indeed the
Commission has declared its intention to carefully monitor the trend of the effective levels
of corporate taxation in the EU
13. Furthermore, the full implication of an approach
implying a co-ordination of the tax bases could indicate that the present differences of
nominal tax rates are unsustainable. 
                                                
13 See EEC (2001b), p.9.29
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